Documents From
Congress' Joint Inquiry into 9/11
Transcript
of hearing
01 Oct 2002
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Hearing About 9/11
SPEAKER: LOCATION: WASHINGTON, D.C. WITNESSES: FRANCIS TAYLOR, COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM, STATE DEPARTMENT BODY:
U.S. SENATOR RICHARD C. SHELBY (R-AL)
During the course of our investigation, we have considered questions about the sharing of information among the major parts of our intelligence community -- the CIA, the NSA, and the FBI -- as well as between law enforcement and the intelligence components, particularly of the FBI. Today we will focus on several other aspects of information sharing. One is the sharing of information between the principal elements of the intelligence community and a range of federal agencies such as the Federal Aviation Administration and the Immigration and Naturalization Service, which are important users of intelligence information and which also may generate intelligence information of use to others. A second issue is the sharing of intelligence information between the federal government and state and local governments, as well as parts of the private sector. We discuss these two issues this morning. We will have a staff report by our staff director, Ms. Eleanor Hill, and then a panel. The panel will include the Honorable James S. Gilmore, III, former governor of the Commonwealth of Virginia and chairman of the Advisory Panel to Asses the Capabilities for Domestic Response to Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction; Ambassador Francis X. Taylor, coordinator for counterterrorism at the Department of State; Mr. Claudio Manno, acting associate undersecretary for intelligence at the Transportation Security Agency; Mr. Joseph P. Greene, assistant commissioner for investigations, U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service; Mr. Louis E. Andre, special assistant to the director for intelligence J-2 of the Defense Intelligence Agency; and Edward T. Norris, police commissioner for the City of Baltimore. Additionally, the committee has received three statements for the record that will not be accompanied by oral testimony. These three statements for the record are by David M. Walker, comptroller general of the United States; Rear Admiral Lowell E. Jacoby, Acting Director Defense Intelligence Agency; and Dr. Robert C. Norris, Jr., chair Information Operations and Technology Department of the National Defense University. I ask unanimous consent that each of these statements be made part of the record of this hearing. (UNKNOWN): So move, Mr. Chairman. CHAIRMAN: Is there a second? (UNKNOWN): Second. CHAIRMAN: Without objection, so ordered. We greatly appreciate the assistance of the comptroller general, Admiral Jacoby and Dr. Norris provided to this joint inquiry. Members of the committee may submit questions for the record to follow up on matters appropriately addressed to them. For further opening statements -- Chairman Goss? GOSS: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. We have had very successful hearings so far in the public, judging from the response we're seeing in the media and on TV and the printed media that this is a value -- what we are doing. And we are very appreciative of our witnesses who are coming forward to help us with our chore of understanding better the consumer side of this and what the needs are at the levels of so many of our agencies who we entrust to do so much important work for the nation in regard to national security. So I look forward to the hearing and I have no further prepared statement, except gratitude for those who are here with us today. CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Congressman Goss. We will commence today with another in the series of excellent presentations by the joint inquiry committee staff. Our staff director, Ms. Eleanor Hill, is now recognized for her report. HILL: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, and members of the Joint Committee. In prior hearings, we have, as you know, discussed specific -- very specific information sharing issues relating to the performance of the intelligence community prior to the events of September 11. Today, I will discuss what our review has, to date, uncovered regarding more systemic aspects of information sharing between the agencies of the intelligence community and between those agencies and other federal, state and local entities. Before addressing the issue of information sharing, however, I would like to first summarize our review of what we have found the non-intelligence community agencies knew about the hijackers. In short, we have not found any evidence that non-intelligence community agencies had any information prior to September 11 that the 19 individuals who took part in the attacks had terrorist ties. We also found that the non-intelligence community agencies were, for the most part, focused on specific threats to their areas -- their particular areas of responsibility, such as airline hijackings or an individual terrorist crossing the border. We did not find any significant and sustained focus on a war against Bin Laden in which terrorist operatives might launch multiple attacks against the continental United States using such tactics as airplanes as weapons. While the FAA, the Customs Service, the State Department and INS each had data concerning the 19 hijackers, that data was not related to their terrorist activities or associations. As a result, none of this information would, by itself, have aroused suspicions regarding a planned terrorist attack within the United States. Instead, these agencies had routine information concerning the vital statistics, travel, immigration and medical status of some of the hijackers. For example, prior to September 11, the FAA had airman records on hijackers Marwan Alshehhi, Mohamed Atta, Hani Hanjour and Ziad Jarrah. The INS also had records concerning the 19 hijackers, specifically the type of visa and the duration of the stay adjudicated by the immigration officer for each individual. Finally, U.S. Customs Service officials have advised the staff that they only information Customs had concerning the 19 hijackers prior to September 11 was contained in the routine forms that they filled out when they arrived in the United States. HILL: Moving on to the general topics of information sharing, during the course of our interviews, intelligence and non-intelligence personnel, alike, complained that a range of political, cultural, jurisdictional, legal and bureaucratic issues are ever present hurdles to information sharing. Prior to the passage of the U.S.A. PATRIOT Act, many suggested that law enforcement information was not adequately shared with the intelligence community. The reverse was also, apparently, true despite amendments to the National Security Act in the 1990s which were designed to make clear that foreign intelligence could be collected for and shared with U.S. law enforcement agencies. We were told that not all threat information in possession of the intelligence community or law enforcement agencies is necessarily shared with agencies that need it the most in order to counter the threats. For example, the FAA was not provided a copy of the FBI's Phoenix memorandum prior to September 11, 2001, and still did not have a copy two weeks after the matter had become public in early 2002. In another example, the CIA did not provide the Department of State with large numbers of intelligence reports that included the names of terrorists suspects until shortly after September 11, 2001. The reasons for this reluctance to share range from a legitimate concern about the protection of intelligence sources and methods to a lack of understanding of the functions of other agencies. The vast majority of the information related to the hijackers or to threats posed by aircraft came to the non-intelligence community agencies from the CIA, the National Security Agency and the FBI. According to officials from the Department of Transportation, State, Energy, Defense and Treasury, unless information in possession of the CIA, NSA and the FBI is shared on a timely basis, they are unable to include dangerous individuals on various watch lists to either deny them entry into the United States or apprehend suspected terrorists while in the United States. The State Department, the Immigration and Naturalization Service and the U.S. Customs Service all maintain watch lists of named individuals. The Federal Aviation Administration, the Drug Enforcement Administration, INS and other agencies also perform a limited amount of information collection designed to place individuals on watch lists. The staff review, to date, has found no single agency or database or computer network that integrates all counterterrorism information nationwide. Information about the hijackers and about Al Qaida can be found in disparate databases spread among a range of intelligence and civilian agencies. As exemplified by the Phoenix communication, FBI information related to possible Al Qaida terrorists was often scattered in various regional offices and not shared with the FBI headquarters or with other agencies. Furthermore, law enforcement, immigration, visa and intelligence information related to the 19 hijackers was not organized in any manner to allow for any one agency to detect terrorism-related trends and patterns in their activities. Numerous officials stated that there are many hurdles to sharing information. A major issue, for example, relates to the availability of properly clear personnel. Some federal agencies we visited which did not have personnel cleared for sensitive compartmented information -- or SCI data -- advised that they could have benefited from receiving more specific data on potential terrorists. We were also told that many state and local agencies do not have personnel cleared for even the lowest level of access to national security information, let alone SCI access. As a result, while appropriately cleared FAA, TSA, INS and Department of State officials may receive significant intelligence information, they may be unable to disseminate data within their organization or to state and local officials because the potential recipients are not cleared to receive it. Another difficulty mentioned repeatedly is the "originator control" or ORCON caveat. Agencies that generate intelligence impose this caveat when disseminating raw and finished intelligence to prohibit further dissemination without their approval. Thus, an agency may receive very important information that could be of use to a third agency that is not a recipient, but may be unable to share it because of the caveat. Although this matter can be resolved through agreed-upon procedures, the process can be lengthy and cumbersome and may not meet the near real time lines often required to track and apprehend terrorist suspects. We were told that because information sharing is inconsistent and haphazard agencies have tried various means available to them to circumvent the hurdles. These include signed memorandum of agreements with other agencies; the use of detailed employees to other intelligence and law enforcement agencies; participation in joint task forces; and attempts to design and field common databases. I want to, at this point, just briefly go through what a number of different agencies told us during our staff discussions with them. And I will start with the FAA and the Transportation Security Administration. Following the hijacking of a TWA aircraft in the Middle East in the mid-1980s, the FAA established a small office, which is now a part of the Transportation Security Administration, to review the incoming intelligence regarding threats to aviation. The intelligence is translated into information circulars, emergency amendments and security directives for the aviation industry. The circulars and directives are issued to domestic and foreign airlines and to the airports to advise them of current and potential terrorist threats. They are also provided to the intelligence community and law enforcement agencies. Prior to September 11, the FAA had issued a number of circulars and directives as a direct result of intelligence received from the intelligence community regarding extremist Islamic groups. These FAA publications advised the airlines of the methods that might be used by such groups to hijack an airplane or to plant explosives in airplanes. None, however, has been found that discussed crashing planes into buildings. The intelligence community is required, by law, to provide the Department of Transportation with intelligence concerning international terrorism. As a result, the department receives intelligence from the CIA, the Department of State, the FBI, the NSA and DIA. However, Transportation officials advised the staff that they do not believe that they receive all of the available intelligence that is needed to perform their mission. In their view, the agencies that collect the information make decisions on what is relevant for and what should be shared with the Department of Transportation. The issue, reportedly, is one of context and depth of understanding. By not receiving the sum total of the intelligence on all transportation issues, the Transportation Security Administration may not be able to connect events or to link suspicious activities. TSA officials stated that, although they can submit their requirements to the intelligence community through established procedures, there is nothing that requires the community to collect against those requirements. Turning to the Immigration and Naturalization Service -- INS -- the INS maintains records on all visitors who arrive in United States. INS officials told the staff that the law enforcement support center -- or the LECS -- in Burlington, Vermont, is a key data sharing center designed to support other law enforcement agencies. The LESC assists in determining the status of detainees or to find persons. INS officials stated that the August 2001 notice to watchlist Nawaf al Hazmi and Kahlid al Mihdhar was not accompanied by any specific notion that indicated that the INS should use all means possible to find these two suspects. INS officials said that had they been told to put highest priority on the search, they would have used the LESC and believe they may have found the two suspects prior to September 11. The Defense Intelligence Agency -- the director of DIA chairs a standing committee that serves as an integrating mechanism for the Department of Defense. It is called the Military Intelligence Board, or MIB. DCI representatives usually attend and participate in its discussions. Over time, the MIB has wrestled with information sharing issues prior to September 11. According to DIA representatives, information sharing issues, such as restrictive caveats, handling of information in virtual and collaborative work spaces, limited distribution to senior officials only and support to homeland defense have been discussed by the MIB since at least the mid-1990s. For example, the need to establish an information sharing mechanism was addressed at least as early as February 1995 in the context of multiagency operations in Haiti. Senior DIA officials told the staff that information sharing issues are not new to the intelligence community and are not limited to the context of September 11. According to them, the basic legal, community, cultural and technological barriers have been understood for years. After the USS Cole attack, the DIA reportedly took significant steps to alter structure, processes, products and policies associated with terrorism analysis. DIA officials advised that the DIA now challenges its analysts to "think out of the box" and to exploit all relevant information, including open-source reporting. They also stated that DIA has implemented mechanisms that allow more effective receipt and dissemination of critical intelligence information. According to DIA personnel, there have been mixed results with the intelligence community partnerships. For example, the mere act of assigning an analyst to another organization does not always ensure a greater level of access to information or more open sharing of information. DIA acknowledged that its analysts who are detailed to counterpart organizations do not have unfettered and unconditional access to all relevant terrorist information. Former DIA director, Admiral Thomas Wilson, explained to the staff that information sharing implies that one, quote, "owns the information," close quote, a concept with which he does not agree. According to Wilson, agencies need to change their culture and shed the belief that they "own" the information. The information belongs to the United States government and the entire intelligence community, at least in his view. Turning to the Department of Treasury -- several Treasury Department components receive intelligence relating to financial matters from the CIA, the NSA, the FBI and other intelligence agencies. Officials in Treasury's Financial Crimes Enforcement Network -- FinCEN -- and the U.S. Customs Service reported to the staff that they submit intelligence requirements to the intelligence community, but have no assurance that the intelligence will be collected and provided to them on a timely and regular basis. The Secret Service at Treasury does occupy a unique position because of its primary mission to protect the president. According to the Secret Service, it does receive the intelligence that is necessary for it to perform that particular mission. Post-September 11, U.S. Customs officials used information available in Treasury databases to develop a comprehensive analysis of the travel, finances and linkages of the hijackers. Specifically, U.S. Custom Service analysts use suspicious activity reports, currency or monetary instrument reports and currency transaction reports obtained from the Treasury Department. Much of the analysis was completed November 2001. Customs officials advised that the majority of the information used in that analysis to show the domestic and international activities and associations of the hijackers came from law enforcement databases, specifically the Interagency Border Inspection System, or IBIS, and not from intelligence. According to the Custom Service, there are over 30,000 users of IBIS. But it has no formal connection, apart from the FBI's participation, to the intelligence community. Turning to the Department of State -- State Department officials advised the staff that at least 1,500 CIA central intelligence reports containing terrorist names were not provided to the TIPOFF watchlisting program until after September 11, 2001. After an analysis of those CIRs was completed, the names of approximately 150 suspected terrorists were identified, and 58 new suspected terrorist names were added to the TIPOFF watchlist. HILL: State Department officials advised that they have had continuing difficulty obtaining data from for watchlisting purposes from the National Crime Information Center's Interstate Identification Index that is managed by the FBI. The events of September 11, 2001, have led to an almost universal acknowledgment in the U.S. government of the need for consolidating and streamlining collection, analysis and dissemination of information concerning threats to the United States and its interests. According to the president's national strategy for homeland security, intelligence contributes to every aspect of homeland security and is a vital foundation for the homeland security efforts. The strategy recognizes that U.S. information technology is the most advanced in the world, but that our information systems have not adequately supported the homeland security mission. According to the strategy, the U.S. government spends about $50 billion per year on information technology, but the systems purchased are not compatible between the agencies of the federal government or with state and local entities. The strategy acknowledges that legal and cultural barriers often prevent agencies from exchanging and integrating intelligence and other information. In response to these problems, the strategy first calls for integrating information sharing across the federal government through the Critical Infrastructure Insurance Office. The strategy also calls for integrating information sharing across state and local governments, private industry and among the U.S. citizenry. Using modern information technology, more information is to be shared among various databases. Finally, the strategy calls for the adoption of standards for information that is an electronic form and is relevant to homeland security. According to the strategy, terrorist-related information from the databases of all government agencies with responsibilities for homeland security is to be integrated. The Department of Justice, the FBI and other federal agencies, as well as numerous state and local law enforcement agencies, will then be able to use data mining tools to apply this information to the homeland security mission. In recent years, a number of commissions established by the Congress have also reported on the ability of United States to respond to terrorist events and have recommended that steps be taken to encourage closer cooperation between the intelligence and law enforcement communities. One of the mechanisms established by Congress, the advisory panel to assess domestic response capabilities for terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction, looked very closely at the issues relating to the sharing of counterterrorism intelligence with state and local officials. The advisory panel was established in 1999 and was chaired by, then, Governor James Gilmore of Virginia, who will be appearing as a witness here this morning. The advisory panel issued three reports in 1999, 2000 and 2001. In its first report, the panel reported that state and local officials had expressed a need for more intelligence and for better information sharing among entities at all levels regarding potential terrorist threats. The report dated that, while the panel was acutely aware of the need to protect classified national security information and the sources and methods by which it may have been obtained, it believed more could be done to provide timely information up, down and laterally -- at all levels of government -- to those who need the information to provide effective deterrence, interdiction, protection and response to potential threats. The panel's second report stated that the potential connection between terrorism originating outside the United States and terrorist acts perpetrated inside the United States means that foreign terrorism may not be easily distinguished from domestic terrorism. In its third and final report, the panel described the results of a survey it had commissioned that substantiated the view that state and local entities are in need of threat assessments and better intelligence concerning potential terrorist activities. The promise of the panel throughout its work has been that all terrorist incidents are local, or at least will begin that way. The panel recommended that a federal office for combating terrorism establish a system for providing clearances you state and local officials; and that the FBI implement an analytic concept, similar to the CIA's reports officers, to do a better job of tracking and analyzing terrorism indicators and warnings. Finally, the General Accounting Office has also completed a number of reports for Congress to focus on combating terrorism, information sharing and homeland security. In addition, GAO's written statement for the record for today's hearing emphasizes the need for a commitment by the leadership of the FBI, CIA and other agencies to transform the law enforcement and intelligence communities and achieve the most effective information sharing possible to combat terrorism. In summary, the joint inquiry staff believes that much information of great potential utility to the counterterrorism effort already exists in the files and databases of many federal, state and local agencies, as well as in the private sector. However, that information is not always shared or made available in timely and effective ways to those who are in a position to act upon it, add it to their analysis and use it to better accomplish their individual missions. Our review has found problems in maximizing the flow of relevant information about within the intelligence community, as well as to and from those outside the community. The reasons for these information disconnects can be, depending on the case, cultural, organizational, human or technological. Comprehensive solutions, while perhaps difficult and costly, must be developed and implemented if we are to maximize our potential for success in the war against terrorism. Mr. Chairman, that concludes my statement. CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Ms. Hill, for another excellent staff presentation. HILL: Thank you. CHAIRMAN: We will now turn to our panel of distinguished witnesses who were previously introduced. I would like to ask each to take their place at the table. Each of our committees has adopted a supplemental rule for this joint inquiry that all witnesses shall be sworn. So I would ask our witnesses to rise at this time. If there is anyone else who might be called upon to testify at this hearing, if they would please rise and take the oath also. Please raise your right hand. Do you solemnly swear that the testimony that you will give before these committees will be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God? (UNKNOWN): I do. (UNKNOWN): I do. (UNKNOWN): I do. CHAIRMAN: Thank you. The full prepared statements of the witnesses will be placed in the record of these proceedings. I will now call on the witnesses to give their oral remarks in the following order: Governor Gilmore, Ambassador Taylor, Mr. Manno, Mr. Greene, Mr. Andre and Commissioner Norris. Governor Gilmore? GILMORE: Mr. Chairman, ranking members, members of this joint commission, thank you very much for the opportunity to be here today in my capacity as chairman of the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction. You have, as you've indicated, the written testimony. Your staff director has given a very able and wonderful summary in which she discussed very much the work of our panel, which has been in existence since the Congress established it by statute back, I believe, in 1998. We began our work in the beginning -- January of 1999. The panel was certainly initiated by Congressman Curt Weldon of Pennsylvania, who has a particular concern, particularly about local responders. But the entire Congress -- members of both houses -- uniformly supported the creation of our panel that began work back in 1999. The mandate was to assess the terrorist threats and potential for attacks targeted against the homeland, here, of the United States. Concern was expressed by the Congress as to whether the country was really willing or was able, really, to respond appropriately if there was an attack, particularly of a weapon of mass destruction. Your staff director has indicated we have given three reports, by statute, on time, in December of each year. The first, in 1999, was an assessment of the threat and was one that expressed concern about the potential for an attack of a weapon of mass destruction, but indicated, I thought, that it was less likely than a conventional attack, which we thought was very highly likely. That report and all the other reports and staff work has been staffed by the Rand Corporation at the behest of the Congress. Mike Warmouth (ph) is here today. Mike, if you would, please, indicate your presence to the members. He has been staff director, together with others at Rand, and have been very able and helpful to all of us. The second report built upon the baseline threat, but also indicated some very important policy conclusions in the year 2000. One was that there was a need for a comprehensive national strategy -- that a national strategy was necessary to begin to prepare for the very high likelihood that some major terrorist attack would occur on the homeland. The recommendation was not for a federal strategy and remains not for a federal strategy. The recommendation is for a national strategy, and that means the inclusion of federal, state and local elements in the creation of the national strategy. Second of all, we recommended that there be an improved structure for the ability to coordinate and establish that national strategy. We recommended a national office of homeland security and, of course, that later became a Ridge Office of Homeland Security. We also recommended, by the way, that office be given significant authority, particularly budget certification authority in order to enable it to do the coordination work. But also we recommended it be Senate-confirmable, and that way we would pull everybody together. The third report builds on the first two and focuses detailed work in the areas of border security; the use of states and locals, particularly; the health community -- in preparation against an attack on bioterrorism; the use of the military, which has been a fundamental concern of our commission because, obviously, of its civil liberties implications -- and so it has to be very carefully handled; and then, finally, cyber terrorism. And that gives you the background. Mr. Chairman, with respect to the issue you have asked us to come speak to you on today, as the staff director indicated, throughout our three reports we indicated concern about the issue of intelligence and intelligence gathering. I might mention, Mr. Chairman, that our commission was due, by statute, for three years and was to go out of business in December of 2001. Following the 9/11 attacks, this Congress extended the commission. We were extended for two years. We remain an advisor to both bodies of this Congress and available. And we will be issuing additional reports in December of this year and, of course, next year, as well, for the fifth year of our commission. With respect to intelligence and sharing of information, are concern has been expressed continuously over the life of this commission. We did a survey, particularly of state and local agencies -- a very large survey. Over 1,000 survey questionnaires were sent. Almost complete response -- almost a uniform response across the country to our commission and we learned a great deal and it allowed us to have what I believe to be a good national perspective. First and foremost, our commission has expressed concern about the lacking of mechanisms to effectively analyze and share intelligence information horizontally across the federal structure -- CIA, FBI, NSA, not to mention the non-intelligence organizations your staff director has so eloquently talked about this morning -- the ability to share that information across the federal areas. And that, of course, is an impediment because of culture and because of turf concerns, which we have identified. In other words, there has, up to this point, not been an ability to draw this information together from disparate intelligence organizations and to do what so many people have said in the last some number of months, the ability to connect the dots. It just hasn't been there because of this difficulty. But the second point is equally as important and the least discussed. And it is the concern that we have expressed about the inability to share information not just horizontally, but vertically -- up and down the line -- federal, state and local -- the inability to share information with governors -- the inability to share information with state emergency operations people -- state police -- localities -- police chiefs -- fire commissioners -- fire chiefs -- health care community people -- emergency operations organizations. This is just as important as the horizontal focus that has been so key to the Congress. Our studies have indicated that, to the extent that there has been intelligence sharing, it has been ad hoc -- it has been without a real systematic approach. And what would you expect? CHAIRMAN: With the intelligence community, it is absolutely within the culture, if not within the statute that you don't (ph) share information. If you do, you're even subject to criminal penalties, not to mention the danger of sharing information and to the danger of people who provided it -- and the capacities of the United States in order to gather it. These are the fundamentals. But these things must be overcome by an appropriate system of sharing information, clearing people, training, exercising and establishing so the people who need the information can, in fact, get it. There is a lack of an overarching strategic approach on this matter up to this point. Now, I will close, Mr. Chairman, I just saying that we also should point out that a lot has gone right -- not just gone wrong, but a lot has gone right. September 11 demonstrated that our citizens arose in a very brave way. Our local responders, who will almost always be the first people on the scene, performed heroically in Virginia and in New York. I was governor of the state at the time that Virginia was attacked -- at the time of the Pentagon attack. I was well aware of all of that. I visited people in the hospitals. I visited our state troopers and awarded them because of their good work. And we have a lot to say about that. The last point I will make, Mr. Chairman, is this -- we are a free and an open society. That is what we are -- that's what makes us Americans. Therefore, we will always be at some level of risk. The challenge that we face is sharing information, establishing a national strategy and putting together the systems necessary to make this country safer while simultaneously, and the same time, in protecting our freedoms and our values that make us Americans. Our commission believes that we can share information -- create it and share it with relevant stakeholders without impinging upon any of these American values. CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much, Governor. Ambassador Taylor? TAYLOR: Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I am proud to be here this morning to represent the State Department to have the opportunity to discuss this very important and vital issue in America's efforts to combat threats to our society from terrorism. Information intelligence is a key weapon in the global war on terrorism. Having timely and accurate intelligence is essential to disrupt terrorist activity and to dismantle terrorist infrastructure. Mr. Chairman, as you mentioned, I have a detailed statement for the record. And I would like to just briefly summarize my remarks in that statement. I would start by indicating my great respect for the men and women of the intelligence and law enforcement community of our nation and the tremendous work they're doing on the front lines of this battle against terrorism. And certainly their efforts should not, in any way, be diminished by our inability, so far, to perhaps exchange that information more effectively. They are fighting America's wars today and are fighting it very effectively. The Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism -- the office I'm privileged to lead -- as the responsibility for coordinating the international counterterrorism policy with the U.S. government and our foreign governments around the world. We are a major intelligence consumer, rather than a producer of intelligence. Our mission depends on timely and efficient flow of information on terrorism and terrorist threats. It also depends on an open relationship with our international partners in the exchange of intelligence information that is so vital in helping them to assist us in the global war on terrorism. I want to emphasize that our department has committed itself, under (ph) our (ph) secretary (ph), and working aggressively with our fellow agencies and international partners to make sure that that information is exchanged that allows us detect, deter and disrupt terrorist activities around the world. Responding specifically to the questions the committee has asked, Mr. Chairman, the State Department and its overseas posts are integrated both into the classified and unclassified electronic communications networks used by federal intelligence agencies. The State Department both receives and transmits information on terrorism directly through those channels. Our bureau of intelligence and research receives terrorism- related sensitive classified information through intelligence community components. In 1987, the State Department established the TIPOFF program for the purposes of using biographic information drawn from intelligence products for watch listing purposes. In 1993, we established the Visas Viper program at the dedicated telegraphic channel for reporting information on known and suspected terrorists directly off the TIPOFF database. The Viper channel is used both by our post overseas and by intelligence agency headquarters in Washington. And it can accommodate multiple addresses to facilitate information sharing among its users. Our Bureau of Consular Affairs receives basic biographic data directly from the FBI's criminal databases, some of which might include information about terrorists, and feeds that information into our Consular Lookout and Support System. We call it CLASS. All consular officers adjudicating visa applications overseas run checks against that system before a visa is issued. Our Bureau of Diplomatic Security receives information from a variety of sources domestically and from federal and local law enforcement agencies. Overseas, information is acquired from host governments or other U.S. government sources at our missions abroad. Once received, diplomatic security forwards this information for inclusion in TIPOFF or in the CLASS system. With regard to interagency groups, the State Department participates in a wide variety of interagency organizations and task forces. A few examples -- the Bureau of Consular Affairs is represented on the FBI's Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force. The Bureau of Intelligence and Research represents the department on the Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism. The Bureau of Diplomatic Security is a member of 19 of the FBI's regional joint terrorism task forces and a member of the headquarters joint terrorism task force. The department is also integrated into a number of intelligence and law enforcement organizations, including INTERPOL, the DCI's Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism and the DCI's Counterterrorism Center in the Office of Homeland Security. My office hosts liaison officers from both the CIA and the FBI International Terrorism Operations Section. As we turn to information technology, terrorism related information, especially that used for watchlisting terrorists, is shared within and without the State Department through a variety of electronic media. For example, the department's TIPOFF watchlist program of 85,000 names receives information electronically and feeds it directly into the CLASS system, which is checked by consular officers worldwide. Under the terms of a 1991 MOU approved by the intelligence and law enforcement community, that information is also entered into the Interagency Border Inspection System -- IBIS -- for use by U.S. Immigration and Customs officers at ports of entry. In August 2002, the entire TIPOFF database, including full biographic records on nearly 85,000 terrorist names, photographs, fingerprints and online source documentation, was made available on CT-LINK -- counterterrorism link -- to authorize users from five intelligence community and law enforcement agencies. The State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research manages Web pages available to other members of the intelligence community on to Web sites -- one classified at the secret level, the other at the top-secret level. The State Department's Bureau for Consular Affairs is an innovator in the use of advanced information technology to make the visa lookout information, including terrorist lookout, available to consular officers around the world on a real time basis. Consistent with the requirements of the USA PATRIOT Act, more than seven million names of persons within the FBI's criminal and other name retrieval records were added to the CLASS system by August 2002, augmenting the more than 5.8 million names records from state, INS, DEA and intelligence sources contained in that system. With regard to state and local cooperation, the Department of State understands the benefits of integrating state and local enforcement agencies into its counterterrorism activities in accordance with applicable laws and regulations. The Bureau of Diplomatic Security has 21 offices in the United States, having liaison responsibility with state and local law enforcement on a variety of law enforcement issues. Currently, discussions are underway with the FBI which will permit a portion of the TIPOFF database to be placed in the National Crime Information Center's violent gangs and terrorist organizations file for access by local law enforcement on a real time basis. When we look at legal questions that affect our ability to exchange information, clearly there were, before the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act, impediments to the sharing of law enforcement data within our TIPOFF and CLASS system. The PATRIOT Act has made significant improvements in the exchange of that information. Finally, Mr. Chairman, we believe the free flow of information regarding terrorism within the department and between the department and other agencies of our government, both federal, state and local, is absolutely the most important thing we can do. While the flow of information has not always been unfettered, we see no institutional or organizational cultural impediments to information sharing that cannot be successfully resolved. Mr. Chairman, that concludes my overview of the testimony. At the conclusion, I would be happy to answer your questions. CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador. Mr. Manno? MANNO: Mr. Chairman and members of the select committee, I am pleased to represent the Department of Transportation and participate in your joint inquiry into the performance of the intelligence community concerning the events of September 11, 2001 -- the terrorist attacks against United States. My full statement addresses the questions posed in your letter of invitation. And I would respectfully request that in the entered into the record. I would also like to verbally summarize the points made in my presentation. CHAIRMAN: Mr. Manno, your statement, as well as the statements that have been submitted by all of the members of the panel, will be part of the record of our hearing. MANNO: Yes, sir. Thank you. I believe a component of your inquiry is to look at the policies and procedures in place at the department to receive and act on intelligence information from the intelligence community and law enforcement organizations concerning terrorism. It is helpful to look at this issue first in terms of how terrorism intelligence flows from the producer agencies of the intelligence community to the Department of Transportation, the Federal Aviation Administration and the Transportation Security Administration. The second part of the process concerns how the information from the intelligence community is passed to the private sector, as well as state and local law enforcement agencies. The mechanisms for passing information by the intelligence community to DOT are well-established. DOT identifies and updates its intelligence needs in detailed statements of intelligence interest. The producer agencies use these to determine which products DOT may receive. To help ensure that the intelligence community agencies share pertinent intelligence with the department, the Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990 required, quote, "the agency of the intelligence community to ensure that intelligence reports concerning international terrorism are made available to the Department of Transportation and the Federal Aviation Administration," end quote. The agencies responsible for producing most of the intelligence that we receive are the CIA, the Department of State, FBI, NSA and DIA. In addition, the department is active in a number of national counterterrorism and law enforcement community efforts, by virtue of its relationship with these agencies. A full-time liaison officer from CIA is posted to the secretary's Office of Intelligence and Security and that office established a part-time liaison position at FBI. The FAA also has provided liaison officer to the National Infrastructure Protection Center -- the NIPC -- at FBI. TSA's Transportation Security Intelligence Service maintains full-time liaison officers at the FBI headquarters in the newly created National Joint Terrorism Task Force; the CIA's Counterterrorism Center; the State Department Office of Intelligence and Threat Analysis. We also plan to post liaison officers in the near future at NSA and DIA, as well as the Office of Homeland Security. Liaison initiatives are also underway to assign TSA personnel to FBI joint terrorism task forces throughout the country. TSA is currently identifying which task forces around the country would be best suited for TSA participation. And TSIS officers detailed to the State Department, CIA and the FBI meet the same high personal and professional standards as the regular employees of these agencies. MANNO: Accordingly, they are fully integrated into these agencies and have the same access and restrictions as the agency's own employees, based on the "need to know" principle and the requirement to protect intelligence and law enforcement sources and methods. Historically, where the department has had issues with this arrangement is in the definitions used by these agencies as to what constitutes "need to know." For example, Specific threat information may be routinely shared, whereas domestically acquired non-threat information, such as terrorist group presence and capabilities needed to evaluate threat information, is provided less often because it is considered investigative material, rather than intelligence. Unlike CIA, DOD and the State Department, the FBI has not, historically, considered itself an intelligence production agency due to the statutory restrictions on the dissemination of information it collects in its investigative role. The department has experienced no significant intelligence sharing problems with state or DOD. With respect to CIA, those few times where we have had problems, those resulted from unfamiliarity, on the part of CIA personnel, with our mission, roles and responsibilities. On a daily basis, the department receives a steady stream of raw reporting and finished intelligence from State Department, CIA and DOD. This flow includes items that are sent electronically; hardcopy products received via courier and cables; and finished intelligence that we can access via community databases. From this inflow, the analysts on our intelligence watch identify on the average of 100 or 200 cables, reports, hardcopy products, faxes and e-mails each day that merit a closer review by us. Up to now, we have not received a similar daily flow of raw reports and finished intelligence from FBI. We have received, however, summary general intelligence on terrorist groups in the U.S. and an assessment on the threat these groups pose to domestic airports and air carriers. In addition, we occasionally receive cables regarding potential threats to transportation or a response to a detailed question or a request for assessment that we may have posed through our liaison officers assigned there. Like other federal agencies, we also receive the FBI's classified terrorist threat warning notices, other alerts and the FBI's annual summary report of terrorism in the United States. We expect, however, that the flow of raw background reporting from FBI will increase in the future program. From the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 authorized the sharing of criminal investigative information with other federal agencies in matters of foreign intelligence encounter intelligence, amending previous laws that prohibited the FBI from sharing Grand Jury and FISA information. So we think that this will be helpful. The process of getting intelligence from the department into the hands of those that need it at the operational level, both state and local law enforcement and the affected parties in the private sector has been accomplished primarily through the preparation and issuance of written notifications, such have information circulars and security directives. As appropriate, strategic assessments of the terrorist threat are also disseminated to provide a general overview of the threat environment. Law enforcement officers responsible for security at airports have access to our notices, which are transmitted to them via the Airport Law Enforcement Agencies Network, or ALEAN. This information is provided as a sensitive security information, which in most cases consists of a declassified version of originally classified information. The declassified versions are prepared with the assistance and cooperation of the originating agencies. Regulated entities, such a air carriers and airports, receive the notices directly. In the case of security directives, the threat information is coupled with mandatory security countermeasures that the air carriers and airport authorities must carry out. For example, watchlisted names are provided to airlines via this process. The information is available to individual airline checking agents in either manual or automated form, depending on the specific airline. In addition to communicating threat information concerning aviation security via written notices, TSA's 24-hour intelligence watch alerts industry representatives to events of potential interest that would not necessarily result in the issuance of written notification. The watch sometimes relays pertinent information that could not be declassified to properly cleared industry representatives. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, we, at the Department of Transportation, recognize the significance of your efforts on behalf of the American people. And we appreciate the opportunity to participate in these proceedings. I would be happy to answer any questions that you may have. CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much, Mr. Manno. Mr. Greene? GREENE: I would like to thank you, Mr. Chairman, and the members of the committee, for the opportunity to testify today on behalf of the INS concerning information and intelligence sharing within the federal government and between federal, state and local agencies. INS sees its function in the war against terrorism in two distinct areas -- an external role of safeguarding the borders of United States against the entry of terrorists and their supporters and an internal role of identifying, locating, apprehending and deporting aliens who pose a threat to the domestic security of United States or aliens who offer support and assistance to those who might pose such a threat. I can report to the joint committee that since the terrorist attacks on the United States, intelligence sharing and its application in our work has increased dramatically. Nevertheless, we also recognize that the process of improving intelligence sharing and joint cooperation in its use is continuous and demands constant commitment on the part of all of the agencies involved. Regarding our work in safeguarding borders, new cooperation between the INS and the Department of State now permits immigration inspectors to assess visa application data during the primary inspection process. These data give inspectors new tools in testing the statements made by an applicant for admission against statements made to consular officers when applying for the visa. In addition, over the past year, the use of the Interagency Border Inspection System -- IBIS -- has been improved with new lookout information, as Ambassador Taylor has indicated. And the INS has expanded the use of that system to include not only applicants for admission into the United States, but also applicants for benefits under the relevant immigration laws. The most significant changes in information sharing since the attacks have occurred, however, in our internal or domestic role. Last month, INS began the phased implementation of the National Security Entry-Exit Registration System -- NSEERS. Initially, under this system INS is requiring the fingerprinting and photographing on arrival of individuals who might pose a potential national security risk to United States. In addition, these people are required to register periodically with the INS, allowing us to better verify that they are complying with the conditions of their non-immigrant status. INS has begun to deploy the Student and Exchange Visitor Information System -- SEVIS -- an Internet-based system that will greatly improve our ability to track and monitor foreign students. This system will greatly enhance our ability to detect those who seek to abuse or exploit our educational and training institutions or unlawful or injurious purposes. INS special agents have participated in the joint terrorism task forces around the country since 1996. Since the attacks, INS and FBI agents have conducted almost 6,500 joint interviews in connection with the investigation of the attacks, themselves, or with related counterterrorism investigations. These interviews have resulted in the arrest of over 526 immigration violators solely on the grounds of immigration law violations in addition to other arrest in connection with investigation, itself. Finally, a word about INS cooperation and information sharing with state and local law enforcement agencies -- the principal vehicle of the INS for information sharing with local law enforcement has been the Law Enforcement Support Center, as Ms. Hill indicated. The Law Enforcement Support Center provides real-time information from INS databases to police officers across the country. In 46 states, the process of querying INS databases is an automated function of the record checks local law enforcement officers routinely conduct. The LESC is past 24 hours a day, seven days a week and provides local police officers with the ability to talk directly to an INS law enforcement technician or special agent about the facts surrounding a specific person in custody. Furthermore, in August, INS entered into a written agreement with state of Florida, under which 35 local law enforcement agencies assigned to regional domestic security task forces in that state were trained in immigration law enforcement and certified to enforce immigration law in connection with their domestic security duties. We are currently engaged in discussions with several other states and localities, exploring the possibilities of similar arrangements. These designs significantly increase the level of effective cooperation between the INS state and local law enforcement officials. While we recognize that significant progress has been made in intelligence sharing and in improving the connectivity between different agencies charged with domestic security law enforcement, we also recognize that still more needs to be done. INS is firmly committed to that effort. We look forward to working with you and the Congress, as a whole, to increase our domestic security and safety to the level demanded and deserved by our people. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would be happy to take your questions at the end of the statement. CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much, Mr. Greene. Mr. Andre? ANDRE: Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I welcome the opportunity to participate in today's hearing. Thank you very much for the invitation. The topic of information sharing is one of exceptional importance and one upon which DIA has focused considerable and specific attention over the past year-and-a-half. Within this topic lies several of the keys to revamping and improving our performance in the war on terrorism. Within a month of the terrorist attack on the USS Cole, in October 2000, DIA took a number of steps to enhance its ability to provide timely, actionable terrorism threat intelligence the Department of Defense equities worldwide. The result of those steps is embodied in the Joint Intelligence Task Force for Combating Terrorism. This reorganization and, more importantly, process re-engineering was based on two fundamental and deeply held beliefs -- both have to do with today's topic of information sharing. The first of these beliefs is that the all source analysis component of the intelligence community, if provided access to a broader base of information, can make a greater contribution to the counterterrorism mission. The second belief is that there are, indeed, significant amounts of information relevant to the terrorist threat that remain under- tapped, underutilized and/or not subjected to sufficient analytic scrutiny. We believed those two things in the immediate aftermath of the USS Cole attack. And we believe them today. There are a variety of reasons why large volumes of information remains under-exploited. Among the most common are strict compartmentation due to source sensitivity; narrow interpretation of laws or executive orders; misunderstanding or incomplete understanding of one another's missions and requirements; or a too narrow view of what does and what does not constitute terrorism-related information. I would like to expand a little on this last point -- the too narrow view of terrorism information. I think it has particular relevance to today's proceedings. I believe we have to redefine and significantly broaden the term "human intelligence collection" when it comes to terrorism intelligence. For example, looking within the Department of Defense, our military security and investigative component -- our military police, special agents, gate guards and the like -- are not intelligence collectors. But they do gather, and not always disseminate, considerable amounts of information they deem to be of little or no interest beyond localized security or criminal concerns. However, this type of information -- stolen credentials and identification; attempts to breach security; robberies; license plate thefts; bribery; or even corruption -- when put in the larger context by insightful analysts equipped with the tools, holds promise of additional terrorism analysis successes. Terrorist activity is, by its very nature, criminal activity. In our search for relevant information, the signal event or the dot that needs to be connected, we must cast a much wider net and then more rigorously mine, examine and interpret the take. There are no insurmountable legal, security or technical obstacles to significantly expanding the base of information available to our terrorism analysts. Progress is being made. As noted, the DIA has made considerable investments designed to optimizing its ability to receive, store and fully exploit a wide range of new information. In my opinion, one of the most prolonged and troubling trends in the intelligence community is the degree to which analysts, while being expected to incorporate all sources of information into their assessments, have been systematically separated from the raw material of their trade. How does happen? A combination of large, analytic workforce drawdowns in the early '90s and voluminous streams of collected data led to a need for more, quote, "front end," unquote, filtering, packaging and productizing of raw data. ANDRE: Thus, the interpretive function determining relevance, importance and meaning of the raw data, moved further inside the organizations that collected the data in the first place. This is not necessarily a bad thing. And I have great respect for those in the processing and exploitation arena who labor to separate the nuggets from the noise, to rationalize the irrational and to add value. Theirs is an indispensable function. However, when our so-called all source analysts are put in the position of basing important judgments on some sources of information or already interpreted sources of information, that is a bad thing. In the area of terrorism analysis, it can be a tragic thing. At least for a few highly complex, high-stakes issues, such as terrorism, where information by its nature is fragmentary, ambiguous and episodic, we need to find ways to emphatically the "all" back in the discipline of all source analysis. While this is an exceptionally simple concept, I am under no illusions that implementing it will be easy or painless. We will need your help and support to pull that off. I thank you in advance for that support. CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Mr. Andre. Commissioner Norris? MIKULSKI: Mr. Chairman, may I exercise... CHAIRMAN: Yes. MIKULSKI: ... a personal privilege? CHAIRMAN: Senator Mikulski? MIKULSKI: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am so delighted that the committee asked Commissioner Norris to come and testify today. This is one of, really, three testimonies he's given on the topic of homeland security. And he brings a very incredible background as both a police officer and in the command and leadership position, serving also in New York and, most recently, the significant experiences we've had in Baltimore. And we're part of the Capitol Region. And I believe his testimony will be very complimentary to Governor Gilmore's in terms of our first responders and the people on the front lines. So I am just delighted that the committee has chosen one of the best of the best to present a testimony. CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Senator. Commissioner, it doesn't get any better than that. NORRIS: Sure doesn't! (LAUGHTER) Is this televised? (LAUGHTER) NORRIS: Mr. Chairman, thank you for inviting me. This is my third time testifying, actually, as Albany -- Senator's remarks. I would like to decline to read my written testimony. It has been submitted for the record, obviously. But, rather, I would prefer to share a couple of stories that are going on right now in Baltimore, which, as you know, is a mid-sized American city. And I would just like to talk about some of the problems we are encountering at the ground level that are -- I think it's -- I chosen to do this because after hearing all the testimony from Governor Gilmore on, I think it kind of underscores the problems we are facing at the very local level. Because if, indeed, the federal government says there is a 100 percent chance we will be hit again, and, as we've heard from the previous testimony, it is going to be a local response, of course, we are still encountering difficulties defending our cities, despite the improvements may. And I would just like to talk about a few of them that people may or may not know about. All of the ones I've talked about -- I can now because they've been out in the public -- in the press. I will just leave out names and addresses if they are pending investigations. One of the things I found rather chilling is something that happened on September 10. And I would have to go back to my experience with New York City police, about 12 years ago because there are striking similarities in both the findings and the response. On November 5th of 1990, I was a lieutenant with the New York City Police Department. And, as we all know now, there was an assassination of a radical Jewish leader in the Marriott hotel on Lexington Avenue in Manhattan. After he was killed, the assassin ran out of the ballroom onto Lexington Avenue, jumped in a Yellow taxicab, jumped immediately out -- was confused -- encountered a police officer, who he shot -- was shot -- and returned fire and wounded at the scene where we had our arrest of our murderer. Going through his pockets and his papers, obviously, we found out where he lived. Upon arriving at his house, we found another gentleman, also, I believe, from Egypt, who answered the door. And what did you think they did for a living? They were New York City cab drivers, who admit being at the scene at the time of the homicide. So pretty clear, obviously, that he jumped in the wrong taxi. We did a search warrant of the house and in the war we came up with huge, voluminous -- according to sources I've spoken to it is the biggest Al Qaida seizure on American soil, still. And there were photographs of New York City landmarks; writings in Arabic and Farsi; diagrams and notebooks and the like. And all of these things were seized by us and the New York City police and brought back to my office. The next day, of course, we give a briefing to our superiors. The question that was posed to me and my detectives was, "Can you tell me this man acted alone -- a lone gunman?" to which the response was, "Of course not. He at least had two other people with him -- were the, you know, the giveaway drivers." We were told, "You shut up. You handle the murder. They handle the conspiracy." -- "they" being the Joint Terrorism Task Force. So, from that day on, our files were turned over -- cases when in different directions. We handled the murder, they handled the terrorism investigation. Almost two years later, there was an explosion at the World Trade Center. I was summoned back to listen to tapes, review documents and the like, only to find out that those documents that we turned over were not translated until midway through the bombing trial of the first Trade Center. The people that I released from my office -- one of them actually drove the van into the World Trade Center in '93. And it's bothered me for a long time. It is now a subject of the books, so we can talk about this publicly. I bring this up because on September 10 of this year, in our city -- in Baltimore, my detectives were out on a routine arson warrant. They find the subject who they are going to arrest for an arson and a harassment and in the apartment, they encounter eight men from various countries -- from Morocco, Pakistan, Somalia and Afghanistan. The apartment is very sparsely furnished -- hardly any furniture, but there are computers and documents -- passports and the like that do not belong to them -- people with different names and photographs. There are also photographs of some landmarks, like Union Station in Washington D.C., Times Square in New York. There are also computers that we seize and cell phones. We got a search warrant for these. They were downloaded by our police department. And in there, we find that in the week preceding September 10, which we have got to keep in mind that is the day we are told we are at a very high state of alert, we find that they were on the Internet for hours at a time in the middle of the night, checking out Web sites such as learnedtofly.com, beapilot.com -- all local airports and the like. Further, analysis of their hard drive that was erased shows photographs of jetliners and many other things. The reason we bring this up now is I don't know what these men have or have not done, other than what I have told you. The investigation continues. But several were released by the federal government that day. And until then, not only that -- the worst that we were told that there is nothing more than expired visa violations of these folks. And there is nothing to indicate an existence of a terrorist cell. Well, that may be true on its face. I mean if they're waiting for notarized plan with a list of terrorists, it's going to be a long wait. This is chillingly, eerily similar to what we encountered years ago and encountered here and there through our daily work as police officers in this country. And to be told this by our federal partners is very disturbing to us. And that's where we stand right now. That investigation continues. And there are a couple of more anecdotal ones I would like to share with you just as part of what had happened in the year since September 11 to date. We had two men on September 11th of 2001 -- the day this country was attacked -- who were seen celebrating the World Trade Center attacks by a deliveryman smart enough to call the police. We apprehended -- we went and can talk to him -- brought them in for questioning. They were subsequently released, I believe, by the FBI. There was no evidence to hold them at the time, which may have been the case. June of this year, we were notified and asked for our help very quickly to please apprehend someone. We ran him through our intelligence division database and, of course, it was one of the people from that night. The point of that little story is the fact that we had no idea that there was an impending investigation of these folks who live in my city. We also had, as you probably know by now, on June 24, Rasmi Al- Shannaq was arrested on Leehigh (ph) Street in Baltimore. He was a previous roommate with Hani Hanjour and Nawaq al Hazmi, the September 11 hijackers. We were notified of this investigation three days before it was taken down. We have -- this is the one that I really would like to bring to everyone's attention -- we have a very competent intelligence division in our department, as most major city police departments. We run our own investigations. And we run them pretty well. But we also check with our federal counterparts to make sure we are not wasting resources and disrupting anybody else's work. We have someone now who we are investigating -- he's a rather radical in our city. We asked our counterparts, "Do you have anything going on this?" And, of course, were told, "Absolutely not." We continued with the investigation and there was a blind hidden (ph) one (ph) database that alerted them to the fact we're still investigating this subject, at which time we were notified and said, "Could we come talk to you? The person we said we're not investigating, we actually are investigating and we need to come talk to you about it. But we couldn't really tell you at the time." There are others, but that's enough for now. I just wanted -- statement I would like to make -- and the fact is I don't -- I'm representing myself. I don't represent the majors and chiefs of the ISEP (ph). But there are several vocal chiefs in this country who feel the same way. Unfortunately, most of them complain privately. And when they are asked publicly, they don't want to say anything for what reason is only known to them. But if we're talking about this as a local response, and there is a need to know, who do we think needs to know more than the chiefs who protect the city's citizens? We need to know more than anybody in this country what is going on in our cities, yet, we don't. And I defy anybody -- you can call people today from any major American city to ask them what is going on in their cities regarding terrorism investigations today and I think you would be surprised at the response. I think I'm going to stop there and answer any questions you may have for me, Senator. CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much, Mr. Commissioner, for a very illuminating set of comments. We have followed a pattern with these hearings of designating four of our members to be the lead questioners -- two from the House -- to from the Senate. Of each of the questioners will have 20 minutes. The designated lead questioners for today are Senator Wyden, Representative Hoekstra, Senator Shelby and Representative Bishop. Representative Bishop has indicated to me that he is about to manage a bill on the House floor and with the consent of Senator Wyden, he will be called upon first so that he can complete this questioning and meet his other responsibilities. Congressman Bishop? (UNKNOWN): Mr. Chairman, if I may, after the four lead questioners, would it be your intention to reassess for lunch? CHAIRMAN: If the four lead questioners all take their full-time, that would put us at approximately 1:00 or closer thereto. So, yes, it would be my expectation that we do the lead questioners, break for lunch, reconvene at 2:30. (UNKNOWN): Mr. Chairman there is a vote at 12:15. CHAIRMAN: Well, then we'll have to -- the senators, then, will have to leave to accommodate that. Congressman Bishop? BISHOP: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And let me thank all of our panelists for bringing very, very illuminating testimony to us this morning. And let me just begin by saying that the joint inquiry has established a number of things, including that the CIA and that NSA possessed critically important information on two of the hijackers -- Mihdhar and Hazmi -- that was buried within the CIA's raw operations cables and the NSA's raw intercepts. Almost no one outside of these agencies was allowed to access these databases of raw human and signals intelligence. The CIA and NSA analysts either did not see this information, or concluded that it did not reach internal thresholds for reporting or did not appreciate the needs of other agencies for that information. Thus, critical information lay dormant for -- in the most basic intelligence databases over a period approaching two years. I mentioned a moment ago that counterterrorism analysts outside CIA and NSA cannot access the databases. That is still true today. DOD, FBI, FAA, INS, State Department -- none of the analysts at these agencies get to examine the information in these databases. I am sure it will come as a shock to the public and even members of this joint inquiry that even the proposed Department of Homeland Security, under the House version of the bill, at least, would not be guaranteed access to these databases. BISHOP: Post-September 11 reviews have revealed over 1,000 CIA reports of cables that contained the names of hundreds of suspected terrorists that were not turned over to watchlist agencies. Mihdhar and Hazmi were in all sort of public and state and federal databases prior to September 11, through which they could have been found, had anyone thought to look. The Department of Transportation never saw the Phoenix memo. And, in hindsight, asserts that the memo would have triggered action in DOT, had it been passed to them. FBI agents handling the Moussaoui case and the Phoenix memo, apparently knew nothing of the history of the Bojinka (ph) plot or the attempt by Algerian terrorists to slam a hijacked airliner into the Eiffel Tower in France. I could go on and on in this vain, but that's a point that is clear. As Ms. Hill testified recently, first, while we cannot conclude that the plot could have been detected if more information had been shared, it is at least a possibility. Second, we, obviously, could have done much better at information sharing and must do better in the future if we hope to succeed in foiling future attacks. Our current mechanisms for information sharing are human liaison and exchange of written reports that reflect a filtering of and the application of judgment to raw intelligence. September 11 proves that these mechanisms alone are inadequate. As the prepared statements of several of our witnesses today make compellingly clear, broader access to raw intelligence is mandatory and we must, at the same time, apply proven computer technology to sift through this massive and detailed data to find correlations, linkages and patterns that small numbers of humans cannot possibly discern. Computers also provide an indelible institutional memory, in contrast to human analysts who rotate from job to job. Ambassador Taylor has told the staff that the main problem is not to gather more information, but rather to use the information and technology to mine what we already acquire. Governor Gilmore has advised us that we must link all of the databases together. Admiral Wilson, the just retired director of DIA, insists that all source analysts have to see all the data we collect, not just what the agency that collected it decides is important or relevant enough to disseminate. His assertion that the humit (ph) and SIGINT databases contain a wealth of useful information that never gets examined is proven by the Mihdhar and Hazmi cases. The joint inquiry has spent an enormous amount of time and effort trying to understand why the intelligence on Hazmi and Mihdhar was not given to analysts and consumers. What we all have to understand is that still today very few counterterrorist analysts can get access to the databases that held the information on Hazmi and Mihdhar. Admiral Jacoby, until recently, the senior intelligence officer for the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, insists that analysts, not collectors, must be the proprietors of raw intelligence data, including, especially, CIA's operations cables; NSA's SIGINT intercepts; and the FBI's terrorist investigatory information. Admiral Jacoby posed to the DCI, himself, on the need for a fundamental shift in culture and in practice. On the other side of this position are the arguments that the imperative to protect sources and methods precludes wider access to raw data. NSA also insists that only people formally inside the SIGINT system can see raw signals intelligence, due to the need to protect the privacy of U.S. persons. In the case of the FBI, there is the added concern about compromising legal proceedings and ongoing investigations. I don't see why people outside the CIA should not be allowed to see sensitive humit (ph) material, provided that these people are subject to the same security standards as CIA employees are. The same is true for NSA. As for the concerns about protecting the privacy of U.S. persons, people outside of NSA can be trained and certified in NSA's so-called "minimization procedures." With respect to the FBI, we hope that the PATRIOT Act has already provided the legal foundation to break down the inappropriate barriers to information sharing. I hope that one of the strong recommendations of this joint inquiry is that all source counterterrorism analysts must have direct access to intelligence databases and the ability to exploit those databases with modern computer tools. I would like to ask Mr. Andre and Ambassador Taylor -- in that order -- to comment on what I have said, particularly with respect to protecting sources and methods, privacy and law enforcement sensitive information. I would also like to ask Mr. Andre this question: Has anything fundamentally changed since 9/11 in terms of who has access to the databases that contained information on Hazmi and Mihdhar? ANDRE: Yes, sir. Thank you. I think if you're -- the way you framed the issue, I couldn't have done it better myself. I am very passionate about the role of all source analysts in this process and believe they have been under valued and under employed in this regard. And to be properly employed, they have to have access to more information. Let me be clear on a couple of points that maybe were not as clear in our statement as they should have been -- that's Admiral Jacoby's, as well as mine -- and that is that there is not now, nor has there been a problem with the sharing of what is deemed to be "threat information." Any information collector -- I know of no instance where an information collector was anything less than very responsive and very responsible and disseminated that information widely with a sense of urgency. So the sharing information, from our perspective, falls more into the category of the Al Mihdhar -- Al Hazmi information, which is sort of seemingly benign activities -- deliberations -- acquisitions -- travel by people that wish us harm. It's that information that we wish to harvest. We don't believe, as all source analysts, that we have to get access to the source data. We understand, completely, the need to protect sourcing and we respect that. There are cases where we certainly would want the freedom to go back to the collector and get some of evaluation of a source to help our analysts when they are evaluating that particular piece of evidence or those assumptions. So it's the substantive data, not the circumstances of its collection that's important to us. Much has fundamentally changed since 9/11. We have a different level of access to data from all of the organizations that you mentioned -- CIA, FBI and NSA. Some of the inhibitions on us getting information reside with us. We have taken a lot of measures to change the way we do business so that the information provider can have a greater degree of confidence that we can be trusted with their data. And, of course, our job is then to show them not only can we be trusted, but we can add value to that information. We have taken a real hard look at some of the documents that are used to tell us why we can't have certain information. For example, in the signals (ph) intelligence world, Executive Order 12333, having looked at that -- I'm not a lawyer, but I've had a team of lawyers look at it -- that document, itself, is a very empowering document that compels sharing of information, not withholding of information. We are very optimistic that things are in train to dramatically increase the level and type of information that is shared. BISHOP: Mr. Taylor? TAYLOR: Thank you, sir. BISHOP: Ambassador -- excuse me. TAYLOR: I think when I spoke to the staff on this matter, I was reflecting on the time that spent on active duty with the United States Air Force as the head of its investigative organization, OSI. And in that position, it became clear to me that our investigative community, our counter-intelligence community and, indeed, our counterterrorism community needs to view information in a different light. Investigators, historically, look at information as it relates to the case that they are working on. And that becomes their focus. It's how we are trained. It's how we focus for prosecution, arrest and so forth and so on. But it also became clear that there are nuggets of information in those investigations that affect more broadly our Air Force. And that one agent that's conducting that case can't have the perspective to understand that without sharing that information more widely within the community. BISHOP: What about analysts? TAYLOR: Well, not solely without an analyst, because analysis is one part of the challenge. The other part of the challenge is enabling others who are part of the rings of security that we have -- for instance, the Customs officer in Seattle that stopped Ramsi Youssef, who is also a key person -- not to do analytical work, but to understand that this particular individual -- someone in the U.S. government knows something about this person that he or she needs to check out. So the challenge is to place into an information technology system the ability for an analyst to get access to things that they need, but also to give to our first responders, to our security officers, to our INS border guards the information they need, which is not the same as the information that our analyst needs. Our border guards need to know that Frank Taylor is a person of interest and, therefore, we need to check him out. Our analyst may want to know a lot more about what Frank Taylor has done. I believe information technology can help us to do this. there is a very real concern with sources and methods. We have to protect those sources and methods because without that, we will never have the information. But I don't think that's insurmountable in triaging the information and providing it in the appropriate channel with the appropriate classification to the people who need it to bring more clarity to the counterterrorism picture. BISHOP: Thank you. Admiral Jacoby's statement for the record, as well as the statement from the General Account Office, stresses the difficulties posed by incompatible database structures and formats -- a problem that afflicts all levels of government across the boardT this incompatibility makes it hard to share data across agencies or to conduct analysis across all of the government's diverse databases. The GAO and DOD statements explain that there is a viable alternative. Now, the private sector has settled on a common data framework and a set of standards that allow full interoperability across organizations. This capability is an essential for industry in the electronic age as it is now for our government in the war on terrorism. But our government is way behind the private sector. Now the commercial standard is called XML. Testimony before us today illustrates how important it is to the war on terrorism for the government to adopt this standard and to move quickly to convert our existing databases. Adoption of XML not only allows full data sharing, it also offers much more effective and efficient ways to analyze data and to automatically update files. Here is another instance where I believe action by the two intelligence committees is warranted now. We could mandate adoption of XML and give the intelligence community a date certain by which it would need to have shifted over to the new standard. Mr. Andre, how difficult would it be for DIA to shift over to the XML standard? Do you think that it's practical to insist that the intelligence community, as a whole, shift to this database standard and do it rapidly? ANDRE: Yes, sir. Thank you. Let me say, a major investment that we have made in the Joint Intelligence Task Force for Combating Terrorism -- JITFCT -- is transitioning their entire data environment into an XML environment. And we think it is exceptionally important for the reasons that you point out. ANDRE: One of the most important aspects of that is the ability to tag at the content level, rather than at the record level. Because we believe that ultimately if, like the commercial sector, the intelligence community adopted the XML approach that data -- they don't have to reside in a single repository. We can have interoperability at the data level and really empower that data and be able to do things with it we can't today. We are a pretty good test case in both the JITF-CT and in the J2 part of DIA because we are also transitioning the J2 part into a fully digital XML environment -- a change in the way we produce our product, using, I might add, off-the-shelf commercial technology. It isn't easy. It is painful. And I guess the big question is -- I think it's a lot simpler to sort of go from a standing start and say, "From this day on, I'm going to be in an XML world," rather than to say, "I've got 40 years worth of great big databases, like the military integrated database. And I've got to convert all of that data -- properly tag it." It will cost a lot of money and it will take a lot of time. but the end result will be certainly worth it. BISHOP: Thank you. According to inquiries by our staff, the FBI contacted both the State Department's Bureau of Diplomatic Security and INS in August of 2001 about Hazmi and Mihdhar. Both agencies possessed information that would have helped locate the two suspects. But the FBI asked for specific information and nothing more and expressed no particular urgency about finding them. Both agencies claim that they had ways of finding the two and could probably have done so, if they had been asked. Could the State Department or INS witnesses please explain how their organizations could have located these two suspects? And could they provide any insight on why the FBI did not explain why it was looking for them and why they didn't request help? TAYLOR: I'll go first, Congressman. Certainly we were informed in August, by a request from the FBI for visa records on both of those individuals. And that's a routine request that we get very frequently and we responded to that request, as we often do, not asking the reason for the inquiry. The FBI runs thousands of investigations where that data is necessary. Today, that would not happen -- we would ask that question, given the benefit of 20/20 hindsight. In our responsibility to investigate visa fraud, we work with many data companies around the world to -- around the country, actually, to look for individuals that we suspect are involved in visa fraud. Most recently, we've had a major investigation involving that and were able to locate 39 of 72 suspects in about a month. We have the capacity to do that -- we know how to do that, but we were not asked to do that. Today, we would ask that question and we would volunteer our assistance to the Bureau if they were, indeed, looking for those individuals. GREENE: Yes, sir. From the INS point of view, not only do we have a variety of other databases that contain information -- people who would apply for benefits under immigration law or people who would travel in and out of the United States that might provide us with some leads, the Law Enforcement Support Center, as I mentioned in my statement, also has access to a variety of criminal databases and also private sector databases that we can then mine to use as potential leads for an investigation. It's not unlike what we did during the first Absconder Initiative last spring. So I think the capability is there, certainly, for us to have made a contribution in terms of actively -- had we been asked, to actively seek this person -- to go -- to take a good shot at going after them and locating them. With respect to the motivations behind the information that we received, I simply can't answer that. But certainly from the standpoint of having capabilities, we believe we could have brought some to the table. BISHOP: I think my time has expired. But, Mr. Chairman, let me thank you and thank Senator Wyden for deferring to me because of the exigencies of my schedule today. And I thank you very much for that. CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Mr. Congressman. And best wishes on the floor of the House of Representatives today. Senator Wyden? WYDEN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I thank Congressman Bishop for his excellent questioning. And, gentlemen, I come to this with the view that our software and search engines and data mining tools can go a long way to beating the terrorists, but we just aren't using what we've got. Because we've got all of these separate government systems, in effect, running databases strewn all over Washington D.C. And they've either been unwilling or unable to get together so they are connected. And then give us the best possible strategy to pick up dangerous trends. And to change this, I wrote legislation. It is now in the intelligence conference -- we are working on it now -- that would create a single database where all U.S. information on terrorists from the intelligence community, other federal agencies and state and local officials can be gathered together and shared with any intelligent or law enforcement official who needs information on suspected terrorists. And what this ensures -- and Commissioner Norris, I think you summed it up -- this ensures that everybody is on the same team -- federal, state and local. And I hear this from law enforcement officials in Oregon. And you have echoed it again. You're not going to win the war on terrorism from Washington D.C. Much of the important work is going to have to be done at the local level. And the reason I bring this up this morning, Mr. Chairman, it is that with this item in conference right now, I hope that what we have heard from these six very good witnesses will give us additional strength in terms of getting that terrorist identification classification system properly funded in the conference. Should be decided, as we all know, very shortly. And gentlemen, I think you have given us some very helpful information to get that properly funded. Let me begin my questioning, if I might, with Mr. Manno. The TSA Office of Civil Aviation Security Intelligence is formerly the FAA's intelligence division. And I want to begin with you. And particularly some of the history. There is years and years of history, beginning in December of 1994, with the Algerian armed Islamic group terrorists -- their hijacking near France -- a flight in Algiers -- and threatening to crash it into the Eiffel Tower. In 1995, evidence came from the Philippine national police raid turning up materials in a Manila apartment talking about crashing an airplane into CIA headquarters. There is years and years of history with respect to the proposition that terrorists are willing to use airplane as the tool to carry out their agenda. Given that -- and my understanding is that FAA, at that time, had some of that information. Why wasn't it used to put in place a comprehensive set of new security procedures so that, for example, let's say, in the late 1990s there could have been a requirement for hardening those cockpit doors -- why wasn't that information that was developed beginning, in a serious way, in 1994 used to put in place tough new security procedures by, let's say, the late 1990s? MANNO: Well, Senator Wyden, we started to take a real close look and perceive the change in the threat environment dating back to 1994. In fact, we worked very closely with the National Intelligent Counsel and asked for and received a national threat assessment that was produced by CIA and FBI. And at that point, actually invited in for classified briefings a wide range of representatives from the aviation industry and airports -- associations like the Air Transport Association in order to explain to them that the threat had, in effect, changed from what it was previously and specifically with respect to some of the radical Islamic groups that appeared at that point to be in this country. That effort -- our ability to actually provide classified briefings -- ironically enough, the briefer on the -- from the FBI side of the house -- because the briefing was actually presented by CIA officers and FBI officers -- was John O'Neill (ph), who subsequently perished in the World Trade Center. Based on that, there were a number of measures that were implemented that changed what was the baseline security measures that had been in effect at that point. In the case of the industry, there is always a desire to know why the regulatory agency, in this case FAA, is requiring additional measures because those things cost money. And so that effort, with the help of the community, helped us to convince them of the change of threat. And there were a number of specific things that were, in fact... WYDEN: On that point, did you do to the industry in, say, the late 1990s and say, "We need changes like hardening the cockpit doors," and they were unwilling support that? MANNO: What we do with the industry -- there is an ongoing effort to keep them apprised of the general threat -- of changes in the threat and changes of MOs by terrorist groups. And we have done that in a number of different ways either through the unclassified information circulars and directives that we sent out -- the briefings that we have conducted for them -- even to the point where we produced a CD that was disseminated to over 750 elements throughout the industry that spelled out, in great detail, what the threat was -- the fact that it was changing. In fact, it even mentioned the possibility of suicide attacks. Again, this was something that was not necessarily based -- it was not based on any specific information that we had received from the community that indicated that these terrorist groups were, in fact, planning something like this. But it was a notion that it was a possibility. WYDEN: With respect to Al Mihdhar and Al Hazmi, did your agency have the names of those two hijackers prior to September 11, 2001? MANNO: Know, sir, we did not. WYDEN: If you had, what steps would have been taken had you had that information? MANNO: Well, prior to 9/11, we had a process -- and we had a so- called watchlist, which was disseminated to the industry of the other security directive process. In fact, a number of the people that were -- we suspected were involved in the -- what we call the Manila plot -- the Bojinka (ph) plot, as you refer to it -- were on that list. And, again, what we would -- the purpose of that process was to highlight, for the air carriers, particular individuals -- individuals that had ties to terrorist groups and that presented a threat to aviation who should either be denied boarding or should be, if they showed up for boarding, be called to the attention of law enforcement. Had we had information that those two individuals presented a threat to aviation or were -- posed a great danger, we would have put them on that list and, you know, they should have been picked up in the reservation process. WYDEN: Is sure intelligence office connected to the major watchlists, like TIPOFF? MANNO: We now have access to TIPOFF through INTELINK and CT- LINK. WYDEN: Has your office ever had direct access to the National Criminal Information Center data that is maintained by the Department of Justice and the FBI? MANNO: Currently, we don't. But we have liaison officers that are posted to CIA and to FBI where they sit side by side with other officers from INS and Customs. And so they are able to access it that way. We are also in the process of -- we are in negotiations with the Customs Service to get access to their TEX (ph) system with a terminal that will be placed in our intelligence watch, which would then give us access to NCIC. So we have indirect access to NCIC through our liaison officers and hopefully soon we will have it directly. WYDEN: Does your agency believe that when there is intelligence information related to a potential threat to civil aviation that you are now getting unfettered access to all of the intelligence, including the raw intelligence? MANNO: I don't think that there's any question in the minds of the agencies that produce the intelligence that if there is specific threat information that we need to act on, that that is provided to us. I think what we may still not be receiving is what Mr. Andre eluded to before -- is the background information that would help our analysts in better understanding the threat environment. We do that to a great extent now in producing threat assessments. The analysts that work in our office of intelligence come from the community. We hire them from other agencies. So they bring that perspective and that has helped. And that kind of information would, in fact, help us do our job better. WYDEN: Let me ask you specifically about the Phoenix memo, obviously, the memo where the FBI agent created an analytical product detailing suspected terrorists seeking flight training. When did your office first see that Phoenix memo? MANNO: The first time that we saw it was when it was brought to our attention by the committee staff when they came to visit us. WYDEN: And when was that? MANNO: So that was... WYDEN: Is it correct that you first saw that memo even after congressional hearings? MANNO: The actual memo, yes. We did not see it until the committee staff brought it to our attention. WYDEN: And when was that? MANNO: I don't know the exact date. But we can get that for you, though. WYDEN: But I am correct in saying that you did not get to see this memo, which many of us felt was an enormously important message? You did not get to see it -- not just before September 11, you did not get to see it until after congressional hearings were held looking into this issue. Is that correct? MANNO: That is correct. WYDEN: All right. How would your office have responded to the Phoenix memo if you had received it prior to September 11th of 2001? MANNO: Well, I think we would have started to ask a lot more probing questions of FBI as to what this was all about to start with. There were a number of things that were done later to try to determine, you know, what connections these people may have had to flight schools by going back to the airman registry in Oklahoma City that is maintained by the FAA to try to identify additional people. In fact, and that is what goes on right now. The law enforcement agencies, of course, have access to that database. And whenever we -- on an ongoing daily basis, whenever our watch were to... WYDEN: Would you have treated that as priority business? In other words, we do have stopped other business to go after that? MANNO: Well, we take all threats seriously. In fact, our process is whenever we get a threat, we opened what we call an ICF -- and intelligence case file. And that is so that we segregate that issue from the hundreds and hundreds and hundreds of other intelligence reports that we get. And then we focus on it. And the work that may entail in trying to determine whether this is a credible threat -- something that needs to be acted upon maybe by going back and working with FBI to try to get additional information. In some cases it can be working with the State Department or the CIA if it requires overseas work. So we make all efforts to try to get to the bottom of what this is all about. WYDEN: What recommendations have you all made regarding suspect flight training and have any of those recommendations been implemented since after September 11? MANNO: Well, now there are a number of things that have been done. There was an effort to sensitize flight schools and fixed base operators that rent aircraft to report suspicious activity immediately to law enforcement agencies. You know, these are the people that can best identify whether somebody that is seeking training and their schools or seeking to rent an aircraft -- that is the best chance that we have that somebody like that will be identified and reported to law enforcement. There also is an effort, actually, by the Justice Department to vet people from other countries that seek to come to this country to obtain flight training where they will have to, in essence, undergo a background investigation before they are actually allowed to take training. WYDEN: I am going to move on to questions some others, Mr. Manno. But I want it understood that with the FAA getting the Phoenix memo in early May of this year 2002 and the FBI agent having written in the summer of 2001, I don't think there is a more graphic example of how dysfunctional this system is. And this is what's got to be changed. And we're going to try and do it with the terrorist identification classification system. I think some of the examples you have given us today are very helpful. But this example is what the reform agenda has got to be all about. You can't explain that to the public -- that something that important -- and significant that was available in the summer of 2001 can't find its way to your agency until May of 2002. I'm going to move on, but, Mr. Chairman, this is something I feel very strongly about. And if we're going to get the jump on the terrorists, this is the kind of information that has got to make its way through the system. Ambassador Taylor, let me, if I might, turn to you on the question of needing more personnel -- it is something that has been touched on several times this morning. Do you need more personnel to process the information that is received? Is this a question of personnel or lack of technology? Tell us what you think the challenge is. TAYLOR: Sir, you're speaking in terms of the information we receive for our... WYDEN: Right. TAYLOR: ... within our visa system? Or just... WYDEN: Right. TAYLOR: ... more broadly? WYDEN: The information you need to get through, and certainly you have touched on the major area of what I'm talking about. TAYLOR: Certainly, we have made a major investment in technology and will continue to make that investment in technology. We do require a to interface with the INTEL community to broaden, perhaps, the top off database to include more databases. We have not been funded for that purpose. And, certainly, should that be the case, I think our secretary has had discussions with Director Tenant on that issue and would look for a collective effort with the director to expand the top off database with other data from CIA databases. I am not in a position here to tell you that I need X number more people or X number more dollars for technology, except to say, sir, that we are focusing very squarely on this need. We have just completed our 2004 budget review with the deputy secretary. I think he believes very strongly that he will reflect those priorities when that budget comes forward. And our department has no higher priority than to focus and improve on our system and the availability of our system to other members of the federal, state and local government. WYDEN: Governor Gilmore, a question for you -- and we have enjoyed working with you over the years. As you know, I chair the Science and Technology Subcommittee, as well, and enjoyed our relationship. Tell me, if you would, what major recommendations did your advisory panel make that have yet to be fulfilled by the administration, Congress and other governmental bodies? GILMORE: Most of the recommendations that we have made have, in fact, been adopted. We have made about 80 or so, Senator Wyden. I think that where our focus is right now is on what we are going to be doing in this coming report, this December. And on that, I believe, we're going to be focusing on the need for a unified fusion center for the purpose of bringing together information from all sources. The emphasis on the questioning today has been on the information -- exchange of information through databases. But our focus has been on the cultural changes that need to be made. And we will probably recommend a fusion center -- probably a stand-alone independent organization that would be in a position to bring information together from all different sources and pull it together. With respect to other recommendations that have not been made -- have not been, at this point, implemented, we don't believe there has been a sufficient focus by the federal government on the necessity of working together with states and locals, particularly the exchange of information. For example, we have suggested that there be major procedures and processes put into place in order to share important information, even after analyzed, Senator, with state officials -- governors and then key officials in the localities. Nothing like that has been done, nor hardly discussed. Even now, most of the discussion is among federal agencies in the exchange of information, as opposed to the true creation of a national strategy. WYDEN: Let's see if I can get one last question in. Mr. Andre, the former DIA director, Admiral Wilson, has told the joint inquiry staff that he was never sure that he received all of the available intelligence information. He also said that senior defense officials received information that his analysts did not receive. And he questioned what good, in effect, it did for him to be aware of intelligence information that his analysts did not receive. So my question to you is what impact, prior to 9/11, did the withholding of some intelligence information from analysts have on the DIA's ability to do the kind of all source analysis that is needed to do the job properly? ANDRE: That is, of course, sir, a tough question because we don't know what we don't know. But it brings up a point -- particularly the issue of information going to very senior officials and not to the analysts. You'll notice in my statement, I talked about information that was not subjected to analytic scrutiny. I think that's the key. We are pleased when a collection agency whispers in the ear of the secretary of defense of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or the director of DIA and that's good. However, to extract meaning from that data -- to perform the true analytic function, we need to get that information into the hands and the brains of analysts who are paid to fill in the gaps of missing information -- to compensate for absent evidence and to turn information into knowledge. That's what we pay them to do. If they don't have the information, they can't do that. So it's hard to judge what the impact of missing information was, except to say, categorically, that our knowledge, thus, was incomplete. WYDEN: Chairman, thank you. CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Senator. Thank you for excellent questions an |